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The monodirectional model of development of technology, from science to marb-, rec'uces 
the role of society regarding techr1ology to a passive element. The society is in. p 1.ctf cl by 
technology. The impacts could be good or ITot. We can identify and analy:t (b ad-
vance) these impacts through the Technology Assessment methodology. Thus 1 <ochnology 
Assessment is the same that Impacts Technology Assessment. 
However, we could interpet the development of technology according to multidirec-
tional models (for example, evolutionary multidirectional models). In these n-.odels the 
society could play an active role. Society is not only the impacted target for technological 
development. Society is also the factor shaping technology. 
The second interpretation of technological development makes possible te. propose 
and perform a methodology of Technology Assessment 'where relevant social groups (in-
volved in or affected by the technology at issue) must be identified and their s::;c;al be-
haviour has to be analyzed in situations of conflict (between groups) in order to detect 
the different technological options and their potential different impacts. It is the io-called 
Social (Strategic or Constructive) Technology Assessment. 
Keywords: technology, technological innovation, models of development of tf.C!uology. 
technology assessment, social technology assessment. 
On and Aut;o:nCHllY of Scientific Theories 
From a well-known point of view, science could be deemed to be inhabi-
tant of a world of objective entities ('World3') different from the objective 
world of material things ('World1') and the subjective world of minds or 
mental states ('World2'). This is an old trichotomy. Popper is its leading 
contemporary proponent. 
1st. 
2nd. 
3d. 
Remembering Popper, science is an inhabitant of the World3, b'ocause: 
Science is a linguistic framework consisting of statements; 
Statements express propositions or thoughts; 
Thoughts do not require any knowing subject to exist, since they are 
ideas - and, thereby, independent entities - that can be comprehended 
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by anyone who is sufficiently familiar with the language or the totality 
of designations used. 
Thus, Thoughts are not subjective; they are not bound up with a 
thinking if!.dividual. They enjoy a separate ontological status and are com-
mon property of many. Therefore, their objectivity cannot be disturbed 
by any corresponding mental states of knowing subjects. Nor can their 
neutrality be affected by biassed knowing subjects. Even if I am tight or 
bored, the thought expressed by E = mc2 does not change while I am 
aware of it. Nor will it be modified because it is comprehended by persons 
with different ideologies. 
The independence of World3 allows us to deem science as autonomous 
with regard to the physical, social and psychological world. Social or psy-
chological characteristics of scientists could be tales attached to a scientific 
theory. On the one hand, they are not factors determining the structure 
of any scientific theory. The consistency of a scientific theory, for example, 
is there regardless of any mental states or the social status of scientists. 
A scientific theory is consistent when it is free from contradiction, in the 
sense that two formulae A and A cannot both be derived in the theory. 
That is all. 
N either psychological nor sociological elements are, on the other hand, 
factors relevant for dynamics of scientific theories. Scientific theories are 
refuted or corroborated regardless of the scientists' particular mental states 
or the kind of social framework at issue. The refutation or corroboration of 
a scientific theory depend on a 'yes' or 'no' said by the world to the theory. 
Intuitions, beliefs, feelings, values, norms, are outside this range of 
relevant factors. They belong to the external history of science. They 
may be, then, affecting the way of making an assumption. In this con-
text, it is not odd that anecdotes are told about the invention of certain 
hypotheses. It has been said, for example, that the chemist Kekule had 
to devise a struct:ural fOIIl1ula for the ben-
zene molecule, when, suddenly, he found an appropriate hypotheses while 
he was dozing in front of his fireplace. 'Gazing into the flames - Hempel 
says - he seemed to see atoms dancing in snakelike arrays. Suddenly, 
one of the snakes formed a ring by seizing hold of its own tail and then 
whirled mockingly before him. Kekule awoke in a flash: he had hit upon 
the now famous and familiar idea of representing the molecular structure 
of benzene by a hexagonal ring,1 It is true. But, one thing is inventing hy-
potheses and something else is accepting these hypothesis into the body of 
scientific knowledge. Hypotheses can be accepted into science if they pass 
1 Carl G. HempeJ. Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice 
Hall, Inc. 1966, p. 16. 
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critical scrutiny, which includes, in particular, logic analysis and empirical 
testing. Therefore, appealing to psychological or social elements (appealing 
to external history of science) to account for the structure or dynamics of 
science is absolutely inappropriate. 
About Basic Science and Science 
This traditional understanding of science is supplemented by a widespread 
distinction between pure science (or basic research) and applied science. 
Scientific theories belong to pure science. Scientists do research into pure 
science without necessarily thinking of applications. try only to sat-
the need to knov:. Plot some theories are "'-f-J iJllCCl. 
then, is simply applied scientific theories. 
If a scientific theory has been applied to a technique, the result will 
be a technology. From this point of view, technology is technique with a 
remarkable trait. Let me explain. 
Techniques are arts and crafts. There are arts and crafts without 
an underlying scientific theory. Then, theoretical ignorance is attached to 
practical knowledge: the practitioner knows how to do something, but he 
does not know that something. The practitioner can successfully control 
events, while ignoring the nature of these events. He, for example, can pro-
duce beer, ignoring the existence of brewer's yeast. Technology is, on the 
contrary, technique with an underlying scientific theory. This theory pro-
vides scientific knowledge about the events early controlled by techniques 
without underlying science. Such theory is like the eye of technique: an 
eye that can see the events controlleci by the technique. In technology, 
theory guides technique. It means that technology 'will successfully con-
trol events previously scientifically explained. Thereby, unlike technique, 
technology's success - its efficiency - does not result only from increasing 
practical knowledge. Technology's efficiency depends on underlying scien-
tific theory. Let me expJain it. 
Once a technology to results from the application of a scientific the-
ory To, to will evolve in parallel to the evolution of To. On the one hand, 
the sequence To, . .. ,Tn means that there is an increasing improvement of 
scientific theories: scientific knowledge grows. It is the so-called 'Scientific 
Progress' .. On the other hand, 'Technological Progress' is called the tech-
nological evolution, that results from a continuous replacement of worse 
technologies by better ones. Improved theories bring about better tech-
nologies. In advancing science, we advance technology. Thereby it can 
be said that, sometimes, scientific progress is paralleled by technological 
progress. 
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are theories and tj are technologies). 
1. D\"n3.1nic5 Scientific ~rbeories and t:orrelaTed 
But \vhat does it n1ean that are 
are different criteria HO'liever, 
there is a theII1.e common te:C!111010~(y lS better than another 
le:cill1.o1oi;H:al progress rneans 1lll-
of our 
necessities, or better, to the abolishing of necessities. 'The neceSSlLles -
says are imposed on man by nature; man answers by imposing 
2Jose Ortega y Gasset. Thoughts on Technology (in C. !Yiitcham &: R. !Yiackey (eds.) 
Philosophy and Technology. Readings in the Phil080phical PTOble7nS of Technology. l\ ew 
York: The Free Press, 1972, 198:3, pp. 290-:31:3). 
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changes on nature'. These changes are technological. Nature is reformed by 
technology. This reformation means that nature is adapted technologically 
to human being. Such adaptation involves technologically abolishing the 
aspects of nature that place us in need. In removing necessities imposed on 
human being by nature, Vie can create increasingly new welfare possibilities. 
Since the Industrial Rn'olution at least, such ,vell-being has depended 
mainly on the application of technology to industry. Applying technology 
to industry means applying scientific KTI,OiV!i':Qe:e to the production. That 
entails that science guides the production procedures and increases their 
measure of effectiveness. The result is 
implies yielding more wealth. As more \vealth is yielded, it seems that 
more \l/ealth can be sociall~y· distributed. 
External of Science 
and Tradit ional 
Science has an inner logic of development, independent of psychological 
or social elements. Applied science equates with technology. Technology 
provides man's scientific control and use of his natural environment. This 
scientific control and use entail social progress. Thus, science developed ac-
cording to its inner logic is the source of social progress. Thereby, neither 
science nor technology must be impeded by external factors. VVe should 
not interrupt or disturb the successful inner vlOrkings of science and tech-
nology by contextual interYentions from society. Social progress assumes 
that science and technology 7711lsi be allowed io Tun by ihemseit'fs without 
social intervention -. 
Another point is argued. During the Industrial Revolution not only 
technology has been applied to industry but a new form of economic mar-
ket has emerged. It is the free market. This market, like science and 
technology, demands freedom and thus blocking any influences from out-
side controls. Therefore: science must be free from externa! constraints, 
technology (applied to industry) must be free from external constraints, 
and the economic market must be free from external constraints. 'Exter-
nal constraints' and 'contextual interventions from society' are synonyms 
here. The global consequence: the alliance 'science/technology/market' 
without contextual interventions from society implies social progress. So-
cial progress assumes that society does not contextually disturb the inner 
working of science, technology and market. 
Sometimes (the traditional argument continues) the specific auton-
omy of technology is argued out because uses of technology are confused 
with technology. However, in speaking of the using of technology, it is con-
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ceded that technology is something by itself. Technology is only applied 
scientific theory, not necessarily used. One may possess a technology and 
not use it. Thus, the use of technology is, on the one hand, extraneous to 
technology. And, on the other, the use of technology may be ethically right 
or wrong. Therefore, technology by itself is ethically neutral (as neutral as 
scientific theory). In short, there is nothing inherently either good or bad 
in technology. lis use may be good or bad 3 . 
Identifying the uses of a technology with a technology by itself leads 
people to blaming neutral technology for negative impacts raised by its 
wrong use. The only way of avoiding these impacts seems to be, then, re-
linquishing the technology at issue. It is the current behaviour of Luddites. 
On the contrary, not confusing technology's uses "with technology by 
itself allows us to assess-l applied technology. 
The first step in a Technology Assessment process is to identify 
positive and negative impacts. 
These impacts may be categorized by disciplinary lines enabling the 
assessment to dravi on specific expertise (e.g. sociologists to treat so-
ciological impacts, economists to treat economic impacts, ... ). It is the 
so-called categorization EPISTLE (Environmental, Psychological, Institu-
tional/Political, Social, Technological, Legal, and Economic impacts). 
In a strict sence, this approach (technologicalimpaci assessment) must 
assume that a technology has been applied. You may only assess effects of 
causes that have already occurred: effects of a technology that has been 
applied5 . 
There 1S a somev;hat more farsighted version to this ap-
proach. Potential technological impacts may also be predicted. In fact, 
early warning and forecasting Vias the main original role attributed to 
Technology Assessment. However, forecasting does not entail here that 
society is then oetie1' enabled to chaTi the course of events. Because the 
traditional conception of the complex science/technology / free-market as 
neutral sources of social progress enhances the idea that society must not 
disturb the inner workings of the method, social constraints have tradi-
3·Ethically. technology is neutral. There is nothing inherently either good or bad 
about it. It is simply a tool. a servant ... '. This text is found in an advertisement for 
the Lnited Technologies Corporation (see Ste\"en L. Goldman. Science, Technology, and 
Social PmgTess. London: Associated C niv. Press, 1989, p" 2(7). 
4See , for example. Alan L. Porter. Frederic A. Rossini. Stanley R. Carpenter. 
A. T. Roper. Ronald W. Larson & Jeffrey S. Tiller. it A Guidebook for Technology 
Assessment and Impact Analysis. :\ew )'orkjOxford: North Hollands, 1980. 
5'After the bulldozer has rolled over us. we can pick ourselves up and carefully 
measure the treadmarks'. says L. Winner (see The Whale and the ReactoT. Chicago & 
London: The Chicago Cniversity Press. 1986. p. 100. 
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tionally not been proposed as appropriate solutions for potential problems 
raised by a technology. Thus, according to the traditional image of sci-
ence/technology /market, these problems should not be solved by social 
intervention, but through better science, better technology, and better mar-
ket6 . 
With the impacts identified, the second step in a Technology 
Assessment process is to study or analyze its magnitude. 
That is the goal of analysis. The of the impacts 
is usually determined cost-benefit analysis in agreement with the tradi-
tional conception of technology. Respecting this, I \vould like to add two 
ren'1arks. 
attention to n "".,."y,,,,,, socialIITlp,ict;s these real or pC)"GE:nlClacl 
has not been usually paid. The reason IS easy to understand: even if it 
would seem that particular persons win or lose, the sum of all technical 
application benefits humankind as a since 'man without technique 
- Ortega says - is not man'. It means that, in contrast to the common 
adaptation of the living being to his environment, man reacts upon his 
environment, adapting it to him. The adaptation of his environment to 
man assumes that man reforms nature that places him in need. That reform 
means that man successfully abolishes the necessities raised by nature. The 
way of doing it is technically to construct a new nature - 'a supernature 
interposed between man and original nature', Ortega says -. If that 
assumption is true, technology would be a better servant to produce this 
supernature than a technique. For technology is scientific technique, and 
scientific technique is more efficient than technique in shaping an artificial 
milieu. 
Secondly, the cost-benefit analysis of impacts on nature assumes that 
nature is a set of economic goods. It means that everything in nature has 
a price7 . Environmental values (e.g. the value of clean water, clean air, 
wilderness, . .. ) are then somehow expressed in dollars. The magnitude 
of an impact, then, depends on the price of the affected natural factor. 
That price, in turn, depends on how much you are prepared to pay for this 
unaffected natural factor. It means that one has ready answers for questions 
like these: how much are you prepared to pay for clean water? or how 
much are you prepared to pay for preserving endangered species? Perhaps 
6'Better science' implies 'more knowledge'. 'Better technology' implies 'more ef-
ficiency'. 'Better market' implies 'more free business'. They do not entail 'more social 
control'. On the contrary. as social control is increasing, less knowledge, less efficiency, 
and worse market are produced. 
iSee , for example, L. Winner. The Whale and the Reactor. Chicago & London: 
The rniversity of Chicago Press. 1986, pp. 123-127. 
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it would be difficult to determine prices like these, but, according to the 
traditional image of science/technology/market, that procedure would be 
the only appropriate way of allocating the natural factors (as economic 
goods) in a rational manner. That allocation would allow us to compare the 
benefits of a technology (in particular, a technology applied to industry in 
free market) to its negative natural impacts, and to take rational decisions 
abou( controls. For example, as Thurow says, 'the basic problem in our 
national debate about pollution controls is that neither side is really willing 
to sit down and place a value on a clean environment and then do the 
necessary calculations to see whether it can be had for less than this price'S. 
Once the impacts identified and analyzed, it is only policy options 
for dealing with the desirable and undesirable consequences that remains. 
Minimizing undesirable consequences (if possible) would optimize de-
sirable effects. It would promote, in turn, positive public perception and 
acce:;Jtance of technology. 
This last aspect is very ir.llportant. For today, there is evidence of 
al1 increasingly broad social concern with the deleterious (direct or indi-
re:.:t) effects of technology. Since technology is applied science, this concern 
afi',~cts science. Thus, science is heading further and further away from 
COl Qucopia to disastermaker. Science is less and less enire'nched in soc-z-
ety This increasingly negative social perception of science could be the 
source of the current CI'isis of sciel1tific vocations and of 
in finding innovation managers. 
The supporters of the traditional 01 
difficulties 
and 
technology assessment blame the crisis on the fact that there IS Ci set of 
tech:lccat.astrophists who are almost paranoid opponents to science. 
radical 
are a kind of neo-Luddites v7-ho are 
r d 1 1 '1 1 . " 9 IOrme aoout re.evant tecnno.oglcal Issues' . Their 
to this set:. 
illiterate and unin-
Drot!lerns \\,-ith science 
and technology are reduced to a matter of lack of information on science 
and technology. Thereby it is necessary to supply society vvith more scien-
tific and technological information. 
I do not agree. The issue is not more information on science and 
technology, but Education on Science/Technology/Society. Let me explain. 
8 Lester Thurow. The ZCTo·Sum Society: Distribution and the Possibililies fOT Eco· 
nomic Change. :\ew York: Basic Books. 1980, p. 105. 
9See , for example. W. Hiifele. 'Energy', in C. Starr.\.: P. Ritterbush (eds.). Science. 
Technology. and the Human PTospeci. I\ew York: Pergamon, 1979. p. 139. 
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Science and. as Sodal Products 
I would like to re-examine the traditional conception or science/technol-
ogy / market /Technology Assessment (TA). 
1st. What does it mean to say that technology is applied science? 
It means that technology results from the application of scientific the-
ories. \Vhat is a scientific theory applied to, when a technology is produced? 
Technology results rrorn scientific theories to early techniques. 
IS historically developed without the benefit of science. 
l.eCrlll:lqi~e anses accident or as a matter of cornmon 
. 10 
ex:perleilCe ~ Its then on concrete of 
trial and error. 
added Irame-
nrrni·prr.~'nt of technologies does not 
COTlcrete ex:p'~n.eIlC'=S, but Increa,Slne~ly better scientific theories. 
2nd. a,mong the factors involved lfl a technology; \vhat IS earlier: 
scientific 
real causes ";::;hat are ~.he first 
"T)nrnnr·,,,tp scientific theories. 
te<:hnl·qU.e have the sarne inner 
lIllProvement of scientific theories depends 
of efficient causes, while the origin and devel-
on fulfilment of fina.l :2 uses. 
'The IH1Provemen.t depends on trial 
""CUl'''. structural 
may be introduced in '-1'l<:"",.l;:'''';:' could IHlprove 
," 
OT a even 11: one still or this 
improvenlent in the function of 
3d. It raises, at On "Yvhen a technique 
becomes a do the purposes or goals, fulfilled 
by this technique, stand outside the technology? On the other hand, 
why is a certain technique for the application of science? 
I will to anS'1;ver these questions altogether. fulfilwent of 
intentions, purposes or, in generaL goals preSlQes at the developn,ent of 
technologies, too. Usually, these goals are the same ones fulfilled by the 
respective techniques. The main difference between technology and tech-
nique is that the first was vastly accelerated in efficiency by having been 
lOSee James h. Feibleman. 'Pure Science. Applied Science, and Technology: An 
Attempt at Definitions' in Carl :"litcham Le Robert :"lackey. Philosophy of Technology. 
Xew York: The Free Press. 1972. pp. :36-38. 
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(where Ti are theories, ti are technologies, and t* is a specific technique) 
Fig. 2. Technique + Scientific Theory = Technology 
brought under applied sciencell . It entails that a technology fulfils definite 
goals better than the respective technique. It does not entail, that 
technology is goal-free. 
The goals of technologies are framed by social contexts. W'ithin 
them, values are normally guiding the formulation of the ends 
of technology. In that sense, technology is called values-laden. 
if this EY i-H) Ll.le:::il'=i 1S then is not the element that 
occurs in the last step of the process that starts with pure science. Technol-
ogy, as science applied to technique, is not something autonomous regarding 
society. Technology by itself is not free from social factors. In sum, the 
social framework in which technology occurs decisively affects technology. 
1 st Consequence 
Thereby, it is not legitimate to say that technology provides social progress 
if its own logic is not disturbed by social elements extraneous to its essence. 
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It could be replied that social elements shape the uses of technology, 
not the technology by itself, because the uses are to satisfy needs, goals or 
purposes. But, it is necessary to review the distinction between technology 
and the use of technology. 
In this context, the term 'technology' usually refers to iool. The 
other potential references are excluded. Certainly it is much easier to 
distinguish between a tool and its use than between a social organization 
and its use (if possible). The apparent straightforwardness of the distinction 
between tools and uses rests, in turn, on the conventional concept of use. 
According to this conventional concept, people think that, as \lifinner says, 
'once things have been made, we interact with them on occasion to achieve 
specific purposes. One picks up a tool, uses it, and puts it dovm. One 
up a telel)i10Ile. talks on and then does not use it for a time ... 
The proper interpretation of the meaning of technology in the mode of use 
seems to be nothing more :ompiicated than an occasional, limited, and 
bl ,-", ,-..j) nonpro _emaclC Im:,eraCl,lOn' -. 
The problems about technoiogy are then constrained to solve the ques-
tion about how the things are made, how they work, and how they are used. 
'How things are made' and 'how things work' are the domain of technolo-
gists. The appropriate answers are yielded in terms of materials, principles 
or scientific procedures. To answer 'hm'! the things are used', it is enough 
to list the different VlaYS in which these things are used to aid in human 
activity. 
The tasks seem very easy. However, this conventional concept of 
technology and use is not right. Even if we consider that 'technology' and 
'tool' are synonyms, it is obvious that technologies are not merely servants 
of human activity. In general, 'technologies are also powerful forces acting 
• , L • . - . ..1 " "'"'h r' • to reshape t,nat actlvIty and Its meanll1g'··. 1 e very act or USll1g certall1 
technologies - like phones, computers, faxes, etc. - reshapes the human 
activity at work and its meaning. These technologies may raise new human 
activities and, at last, become forms of life, because 'life V'loelld scarcely be 
thinkable without them'H. 
2nd Consequence 
The interpretation of technologies as forms of life entails that it is not 
right to see technologies as things which, once they are made, \ve have 
12See, for example, L. Winner. The Whale and t.he Reactor, Chic2_go &: London: 
The University of Chicago Press. 1996, p. 6. 
13ibid. p.6. 
14ibid. p. 11. 
42 1. 5ANAfARTIX 
an occasional interaction with. On the contrary, the only existence of 
certain technologies (for example, computers), beyond their occasional use, 
is introducing vast transformations in the texture of life. 
Take the case, for example, of the introduction of computers in our 
society. Computers are not only increasing productivity; they are radically 
changing the process of production. Computers are not only used to do 
banking transactions, to write papers, or, through networks, to send mail; 
they are radically changing our concepts of time and space. Thereby, it is 
not then enough to list occasional uses, on answering the question 'How 
is a technology used', or, better said, 'How is it going to be used'. Fur-
thermore, it is necessary to clarify the transformation of human activity 
and its meaning by the mediating role of technological devices15 . In other 
words, it is necessary to scrutinize the technology, not its occasional uses, 
to understand how it could affect the same texture of our life. Forecasting 
is required. 
Certainly, as I said, early warning and forecasting has been the main 
original role attributed to traditional Technology Assessment. However, as 
I said, forecasting does not entail here that society is then better able to 
chart the course of events. Because technological innovation - without 
unjustifiable social intervention - is the basic cause of the social progress, 
one assumes traditionally that technological innovation will be carried out, 
that is to say: the effects or impacts of this technological innovation are 
going to happen in any case. Forecasting the impacts helps us then to 
conform to them. As the Guidebook of the Chicago's International Ex-
position (1933), dedicated to a 'Century of Progress', asserted: 'Science 
finds, applies, Man conforms'. Forecasting means then that it 
would be convenient to know the potential effects of a technological inno-
vation. one ',\Till be ready to human societies the same 
But 
3d Consequence 
If technology is goals-laden, social intervention, or better said, social mas· 
tery of technology is not only justified, but required. 
It means that forecasting potential effects of a technological innova-
tion need not imply the necessity to conform to them, but the requirement 
to chart the course of the events. A potential event is the generating of a 
new form of life. Thereby, it is not enough on that score to analyze po-
15This transformation affects from concepts of self to new social relationships. 
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tential uses of the technology at issue. It is necessary to identify potential 
new forms of life which could be produced. 
The new tasks of Technology Assessment, or better said, Social As-
sessment of Technology are very difficult to carry out. But the social en-
trenchment of technology seems to currently depend on it. Only when 
society begins to play its role in the technological decision making, society 
will begin +'0 see technology as something else. To fulfil this objective, it is 
necessary to enhance new ways of democratic decision making. 
A possible procedure is the so-called 'Constructive Technology Assess-
ment' (CTA). In order to put technology under democratic decision mak-
ing, this procedure consists of technology assessment, modified by three 
ne\~l elements: 
1st. An assessment of the potential of a new that 
would be brought forward by the social groups concerned or repre-
sentatives of the society at large. Here, Specific Technoethics Com-
mittees could be useful. 
2nd .. Entities (parliaments, research units, corporations... ), which the 
technological innovation at issue may be concerned with, will develop 
possible technological and, if need be, organizational soiutions to be 
problems identified by 'experts' as well as social groups. 
3d. Procedures for feedback from social interpretations to technological 
de . p"n 16 -Slo -- . 
J6See Paul Slaa Se E. J. Tuininga. 'Constructing Technology with Techno!ogy As-
sessment' in xliguel A. Quintanilla (ed.) Evaluacion Parlamentaria de las Opciones Cien-
tificas by Tecnologicas. xladrid: Cellt ro de Estudios Constitucionales. 1989. pp. 99-11l. 
Slaa and Tuininga add there two examples of CTA. The first is a summary of an extensive 
case study carried out by hap Jelsma for the :--;etherlands Organization for Technol-
ogy Assessment (:--;OTA) about recombinant -D:--;A experiments. The second is a recent 
project on the 'Integrated Services Digital :"etwork' (ISDK) an integration of the tele-
phone. telex and datanetworks . to be installed EC-wide in the course of the 1990s. 
According to some leading consumer and privacy organizations. this new technology is a 
threat to individual privacy and to the principle of uniform public access to the telephone 
service. Thereby, the NOTA has carried out a CTA on this project. Firstly. an overview 
was provided of social concerns and proposed modifications (these are reported in Paul 
Slaa. ISDN As design problem. The Hague: NOTA. 1988). Secondly, these concerns and 
changes were discussed by all groups involved (industry. trade unions, consumer repre-
sentatives, government) in a workshop. Thirdly, based on these discussions an advisory 
report was brought to parliament in which political and organizational proposals are made 
[See Paul Slaa and E. J. Tuininga. op. cit.. pp. 10S-106]. 
In Jose Sanlllartin. 'Genethics: The Social Assessment of the Risks and Impacts of Genetic 
Engineering'. in Carl f-.litcham (ed.). Philosophy and Technology: Spanish Philosophy of 
Technology. ·l\luwer (in print), a Social Assessment ef Genetic Screening Tests is intended. 
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Fig. 3. Social Assessment of Technology 
This kind of procedure could raIse a positive public perception of a tech-
nology and help technology to solidly establish in society. 
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